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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Edward Steven appeals from an order of the Appellate 
Division of the District Court affirming a judgment entered 
against him for Driving Under the Influence of an 
Intoxicating Liquor in violation of Title 20 V.I.C.S 493(a)(1) 
and rejecting Steven's constitutional challenge to that 
statute. Because we agree that Title 20 V.I.C. S 493(a)(1) is 
constitutional, we will affirm the district court's order. 
 
I. 
 
On October 19, 1995, police officers on routine patrol 
stopped Steven when they observed that his car did not 
have a license plate or taillights. In questioning Steven, one 
of the officers smelled alcohol on Steven's breath and 
noticed that his speech was slurred and his eyes were 
glassy. The officer advised Steven of his Miranda rights, and 
Steven then admitted that he had been drinking earlier that 
day. After then failing a series of sobriety tests, Steven was 
arrested on charges of Driving Under the Influence of an 
Intoxicating Liquor, in violation of Title 20 V.I.C.S 493(a)(1) 
and Operating a Motor Vehicle Without a License Plate in 
violation of Title 20 V.I.C. S 331(3). 
 
By order dated April 17, 1996, the Territorial Court of the 
Virgin Islands denied Steven's motion to dismiss the Title 
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20 V.I.C. S 493(a)(1) charge on the basis of unconstitutional 
vagueness. Steven was found guilty of both charges on May 
16, 1996. Steven appealed the Territorial Court's judgment 
to the District Court of the Virgin Islands, asserting that 
Title 20 V.I.C. S 493(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague. The 
district court affirmed the Territorial Court's judgment by 
opinion entered on April 23, 1997. This timely appeal 
followed. We exercise plenary review over the district court's 
determination as to the constitutionality of the challenged 
statute. United States v. Parker, 108 F.3d 28, 29 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
 
II. 
 
Pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, a criminal 
statute is unconstitutional if it "either forbids or requires 
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning .. . ." 
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
The concept of unconstitutional vagueness is derived from 
a basic notion of fairness; citizens must be given fair 
warning before being held culpable for conduct deemed to 
be criminal. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972); 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). A 
statute therefore meets the constitutional standard of 
certainty if its language conveys a sufficiently definite 
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by 
common understanding and practices. United States v. 
Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
929 (1977). 
 
Title 20 V.I.C. S 493(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that 
"[i]t is unlawful for any person who is under the influence 
of an intoxicating liquor . . . to drive, operate, or be in 
actual physical control of, any motor vehicle within the 
Territory." Steven contends that the term "under the 
influence" as used in the statute is so vague as to render 
the statute unconstitutional. We disagree. 
 
Courts have consistently rejected constitutional 
vagueness challenges to statutes containing the term 
"under the influence." See, e.g., Government of the Virgin 
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Islands v. Tonge, 1996 WL 255710 (Terr. V.I. August 17, 
1996)(rejecting constitutional vagueness challenge to Title 
20 V.I.C. S 493(a)(1)); People v. Seefeldt, 445 N.E.2d 427 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1983)(upholding constitutionality of a statute 
prohibiting driving "under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor"); State v. Campbell, 681 P.2d 679 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1984)(finding that the term "driving under the influence" 
does not render a statute void for vagueness). In addition, 
courts have recognized for over half a century that driving 
"under the influence" is commonly understood to mean 
driving in a state of intoxication that lessens a person's 
normal ability for clarity and control. See, e.g, Weston v. 
State, 65 P.2d 652, 654 (Ariz. 1937); State v. Graham, 222 
N.W. 909, 911 (Minn. 1929). This common understanding 
is consistent with the obvious purpose of drunk driving 
statutes; i.e., to prevent people from driving unsafely due to 
an alcohol-induced diminished capacity. Because driving 
"under the influence" is commonly understood, it therefore 
puts citizens on fair notice of proscribed conduct. 
Accordingly, we find that Title 20 V.I.C. S 493(a)(1) is not 
void for vagueness. 
 
At oral argument, Steven suggested that S 493(a)(1) is 
unconstitutionally vague unless some proof of blood alcohol 
level is offered to prove intoxication. We disagree. This issue 
was definitively decided in Government of the Virgin Islands 
v. Zachry, 24 V.I. 244 (Terr. Ct. 1989). In Zachry, the 
territorial court specifically upheld the constitutionality of 
the "driving under the influence" statute and noted that 
"driving under the influence must be construed under a 
bare minimum analysis; any consumption, however minute, 
of alcohol violates S 493(a)(1)." Zachry, 24 V.I. at 247. The 
Zachry court distinguished the "driving while intoxicated" 
offense under S 493(a)(2), which requires a specific 
percentage of blood alcohol content, from the "driving under 
the influence" offense under S 493(a)(1), which does not 
require a minimum blood alcohol content. Id. at 246-47. We 
read Zachry, therefore, to hold that because the touchstone 
of the "driving under the influence" statute is the effect the 
alcohol creates, i.e. the inability to drive safely, as opposed 
to the quantity of alcohol consumed, no minimum blood 
alcohol level is required for a conviction underS 493(a)(1) so 
long as the driver's capacity to operate the motor vehicle 
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safely is impaired. Zachry is consistent with and supports 
our view of the statute.1 
 
Steven further contends that the statute fails to pass 
constitutional muster because it permits subjective 
pretextual interpretation by law enforcement officials. This 
argument is without merit. The fact that the officers 
exercised independent judgment in assessing whether 
Steven was intoxicated at the time of his arrest does not 
bear upon the constitutionality of the otherwise clear drunk 
driving statute. 
 
III. 
 
Accordingly, because we conclude that Title 20 V.I.C. 
S 493(a)(1) is sufficiently definite to survive constitutional 
scrutiny, we will affirm the order of the Appellate Division 
of the District Court affirming the judgment entered by the 
Territorial Court against Steven. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
__________________________________________________________________ 
                                
1. The district court questioned the holding in Zachry by stating "to the 
extent that Zachry conflicts with this opinion, it is expressly 
overruled." 
Op. at 12-13. Because we do not read Zachry to be inconsistent with our 
view, we have no need to overrule Zachry here.  
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